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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this study different stages in South African political history are discussed to 
indicate how the government dealt with the issue of extradition. Reference will be 
made to aspects relating to the protection of the suspect’s procedural rights as well 
as to the protection of the individual’s right to freedom from torture. Such 
examination will refer to the position in South African law as well as the position on 
the international front. Attention is given to developments in case law as well as to 
how the courts approach the tension between extradition and human rights both 
locally and internationally. 
 
It is submitted that the extradition process is the most effective procedure available 
to return an offender to the state seeking his prosecution. The process has however, 
in modern times adapted to uphold the rights of the suspect whose return is 
requested. This can be seen from the provisions included in recent treaties and 
conventions, most notably the European Convention on Extradition to which South 
Africa became a party in 2003. States rely on extradition conventions, general 
schemes such as the Common Wealth Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive 
Offenders of 1990 and domestic law also plays a vital role as a legal base for 
extradition. In cases were a treaty is not applicable, extradition may also take place 
in terms of the aut dedere aut judicare principle or through comity. Extradition is 
clearly concerned with the balancing of the offender’s human rights and the need for 
effective enforcement of domestic and international criminal law. 
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Prior to 1994, many states declined to interact with South Africa in general and more 
specifically in the investigation and prosecution of crime because during the 
apartheid era South Africa became politically isolated. States, which had extradition 
arrangements with South Africa, cancelled them during apartheid and few states 
were willing to enter into new extradition agreements with South Africa1. The 
extradition agreements that were concluded were limited to states within the 
Southern African region2 and to states such as Israel3 and the Republic of China4. In 
the situation where no extradition agreement existed between South Africa and the 
requesting state, a special arrangement had to be made for South Africa to return a 
suspect to this particular state.  
 
After South Africa had gained its democracy, many States entered into new 
arrangements for extradition with South Africa. The apartheid era ended in 1994 and 
as a result, on the 20th of July 1994 South Africa was readmitted into the 
Commonwealth. This development accelerated in May 2003 when South Africa 
acceded to the European Convention on Extradition5, and thus became party to 
extradition agreements with a further fifty states. This then meant that South Africa 
can extradite fugitives to other countries without necessarily entering into bilateral 
extradition treaties. This convention has been invoked recently, in May 2012, South 
Africa was faced with an extradition case of Mr Louka from Cyprus who allegedly 
                                                          
1
Dugard, International Law – A South African Perspective 2
nd
 ed. (2000) 156. 
2
 Swaziland (Proc R292 GGE 2179 of 4 October 1968 ( RegGaz 1026, Botswana ( Proc R118 
GG2376 of 2 May 1969 (RegGaz 1128), and Malawi (Proc 67 GG 3424 of 24 March 1972). 
3
Proc R14 GGE 6362 of 5 February 1960 (RegGaz 6), amended by Proc R184 GG 5283 of 10 
September 1976 (RegGaz 2367). Also see Dugard J, International law: A South African Perspective 
(2011) 4ed pg 215. 
4
Proc 83 GG 11316 of 24 May 1988. 
5
European Convention on Extradition NO:024. 
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committed murder in South Africa.6 The court ruled in favour of extradition as Cyprus 
had joined the European Convention on Extradition (EU) in 2004, because Cyprus 
joined the EU in 2004 this meant that extradition was possible. Even though Cyprus 
and South Africa do not have an existing extradition treaty, government authority of 
both countries signed a co-operation agreement to fight organised crime and money 
laundering.7Transborder-movement of human beings has increased dramatically 
over the past decade globally. Also, South Africa has become a desirable state for 
fugitives to hide in.8 
 
Extradition is known to be a method of surrendering an alleged offender from one 
state to another for prosecution9. The person is then taken back to the state where 
the alleged offence had taken place so that he could be tried (and convicted). The 
purpose to be achieved by extradition is to prevent the successful escape of persons 
accused of crime, and to secure their return to the state where they allegedly 
committed the offence.  The return of suspected criminals is secured by means of 
extradition agreements between states10.  Extradition can take place in terms of 
reciprocal agreements entered into bilaterally, in terms of multilateral conventions or 
based on international comity recognised between states in general. 
                                                          
6
 Fenwick S’ Eye Witness News’: available on ewn.co.za/2012/05/14/Louca-extradition-hearing-
postponed (accessed on the 5
th
 of September 2012). 
7
 The Government of South Africa v Louka George (unreported case). 
8
 Example of such includes Jurgen Harksen, James Kilgore, Khalfan Khamis Mohammed and General 
Kayumba Nyamwasa. 
9
Dugard International Law 42. 
10
Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2000 (2) SA 825 (CC) para 4. 
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South Africa’s ability to participate in extradition procedures is regulated by the 
Extradition Act11. The Extradition Act fulfils a threefold purpose. First it serves as an 
enabling act for entering into treaties in accordance with certain guidelines12. 
Secondly the Extradition Act provides for the procedure to be followed in the 
execution of extradition request13. Thirdly the Extradition Act provides for the manner 
in which persons extradited to the Republic should be dealt with14. 
 
Under international law the prohibition of torture, or the rightto physical integrity, has 
a special status. It is not only non-derogable in the International Covenant on Civil 
Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights15and African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, it is also ensured without any restriction whatsoever16. 
Specialised treaties have been adopted both on the international and the 
regionallevel in order to battle the worldwide practice of torture17. The definition of 
torture in article 1(1) of the 1984 Torture Convention must be regarded as 
authoritative. It provides: 
 “[T]orture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or with 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions”.
18
 
                                                          
11
Act 67 of 1962. 
12
Section 2 of the Extradition Act. 
13
Sections 3 to 17 of the Extradition Act. 
14
Sections 19 to 20 of the Extradition Act. 
15
European Convention on Human Rights CET NO 005. 
16
 It has amongst others been included in Art. 5 of the UDHR, Art.3 of the four Geneva Conventions, 
Art.7 of the ICCPR, Art.3 of the ECHR, Art.5 of the ACHR. 
17
 In 1987, the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment came into force, calling on States Parties to criminalise torture. South Africa 
signed this Convention in 1993 and subsequently ratified it in 1998.  
18
Article 1(1) of the Torture Convention,1984. 
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Apart from the provisions of the Convention, torture and other forms of inhuman and 
cruel treatment or punishment have been prohibited in terms of codified international 
law since at least 1948. International rights instruments including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 7), the Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Geneva 
(Article 13)19 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8)20, in 
one way or the other, prohibit torture and other acts of severe ill-treatment as a 
peremptory norm of international law. This prohibition is absolute and non-derogable, 
meaning that no act amounting to torture or severe ill-treatment can be justified in 
any way or form, or for any reason whatsoever. The first sentence of Articles 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 5(2) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights state that:  
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”.  
 
This prohibition relates both to physical pain and mental suffering. None of the 
monitoring bodies make a clear distinction between the different concepts21. 
However, in hierarchical terms torture is considered the most serious violation, 
followed by, respectively, cruel and inhuman treatment, and degrading treatment or 
punishment22. Torture involves the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering23. 
                                                          
19
 12 August 1949. 
20
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court A/CONF.183/9. 
21
Rodley N ‘The Definitions of Torture in International Law’ Current Legal Problems, Vol. 55, (2002). 
467-493. 
22
 UN Committee Against Torture (2008) General Comment – Convention Against Torture And Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment General Comment No. 2, Implementation of 
Article 2 by States Parties, Thirty-ninth session, 5-23 November 2007, para 3. 
23
 UN Committee Against Torture (2008) General Comment – Convention Against Torture And Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment General Comment No. 2, Implementation of 
Article 2 by States Parties, Thirty-ninth session, 5-23 November 2007, para 10. 
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Cruel and inhuman treatment concerns the causing of intense physical and mental 
suffering. Degrading treatment mainly entails (severe) humiliation of the victim. 
Apart from the Convention, in terms of section 1 of the Constitution24, dignity is a 
founding value underlying our constitutional democracy. Section 10 of the Bill of 
Rights affirms the right to dignity as an inherent right and determines that every 
person has a right to have his or her dignity respected and protected. Moreover, 
section 12(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to freedom and 
security of the person, which includes the right not to be tortured in any way and the 
right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, whilst 
section 12(2) of the Constitution determines that everyone has the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, including the right to security in, and control over, his or her 
body, as well as the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments 
without their informed consent.  
 
More than 14 years after South Africa ratified the Convention, legislation 25 
criminalising torture and incorporating other provisions of the Convention has finally 
been enacted as law. This is a sign of development for the South African domestic 
law. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
The Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
25
The Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
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2. The aim of the research 
This paper will focus on the legislation governing extradition from a South African 
perspective. The author will specifically analyse the extent to which South Africa 
complies with its national and international human rights obligations in extraditing 
suspected offenders. To achieve this, the author will examine the relevant treaties- 
UN, European, African, SADC and the relevant domestic law, that is the constitution, 
Extradition Act and case law. Because of the fact that case law shows that there has 
been an overlap between the jurisprudence on deportation and extradition, the 
author will also examine the recent case law from the Supreme Court of Appeal on 
the relationship between extradition and human rights especially the right to freedom 
of torture.  
 
3. Research question 
The purpose of this study is to highlight the obligations imposed on South Africa by 
the Extradition Act, the constitution and international law, with respect to extraditing 
people to countries where there is a risk that their right to freedom from torture might 
be violated. This research argues that extradition can only be carried out when the 
fundamental human rights of the individual will not be violated. Put differently, is 
there any legal tension between human rights of fugitives and the right of states to 
extradite such fugitives? And what human considerations must a state take before 
extraditing fugitives to the requesting foreign state? 
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4. Literature review 
Dugard26 notes that international law does not recognise any general duty on the 
part of States to surrender criminals. In practice therefore, the return of criminals is 
secured by means of extradition agreements between States. The treaties always do 
not include crimes of a political nature among the extraditable offenses. In the 
context of South Africa, the concept of political offenses assumed great importance 
after the abolition of apartheid and the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation 
movements in 1990, in order to decide who should be pardoned or granted 
indemnity under the Indemnity Act of 1990, to allow exiles to return home and 
convicted political offenders to be released27.  
 
Dugard has criticised the decision of the Constitutional Court in Harksen28. He is of 
the opinion that the Constitutional Court should have examined the interpretation of 
section 23129 in greater detail. The writer is concerned with the lack of transparency 
and democracy created by the application of section 3(2)30. This section creates a 
situation where transparency and accountability by the Executive to Parliament in 
matters relating to extradition will apply except in the situation where the offender is 
extradited in terms of s 3(2). Accordingly, the writer is of the opinion that, that 
situation is unacceptable in light of South Africa’s new constitutional order. 
 
                                                          
26
 Dugard J, International law: A South African Perspective  4ed(2011) 214. 
27
Dugard J, Van Wyngaert C, “Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights”(1998). 
28
Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (5) BCLR 478 (CC). 
29
The Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
30
Extradition Act 67 of 1962. 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Kemp highlights that extradition has by custom been an aspect of international 
law.31Thus emphasis has been placed on the role of the executive rather than the 
courts (judiciary). He provides two reasons, why the emphasis should be on the 
procedural process rather than the executive. 
 
First he argues that human rights and due processes are best protected when 
viewed as an extension of the criminal justice system rather than as a matter of 
international relations. Secondly he argues that the aim of extradition should be 
effective criminal justice rather than international state relations. 
 
On the other side Gilbert32 argues that the delicate balance seen in extradition law 
between, on the one hand, its provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters at 
an international level between states and, on the other, its protection of the rights of 
the fugitive, means that occasionally there will be a conflict and that one party will 
suffer. The recognition of both aspects of extradition law is essential to a full 
understanding of its operation and future development. 
 
Katz33 looks at South Africa's emergence from isolation and its consequences, the 
cases of Mohamed and Kaunda, and the development of the laws of extradition and 
mutual legal assistance. He argues that the recent responses by the legislature, 
executive and judiciary to South Africa's re-emergence in global affairs and the 
increasing and more dangerous terrorist activities in the last decade will guide and 
                                                          
31
 Kemp GP, "Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and the risk of abuse of process: a human 
rights perspective" (2006) 730-743. 
32
 Gilbert G, Aspects of Extradition Law: International Studies in Human Rights (Volume 17) 
(1991)148. 
33
 Katz A, “The Transformation of South Africa's Role in International Co-Operation in Criminal 
Matters” conference on 7-8 February 2005. (http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/confpaps/katz.htm). 
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shape the future of South Africa's role in global and regional attempts to investigate 
and prosecute international crime.  
 
This research will discuss the approaches adopted by the South African courts in 
protecting human rights with regard to extradition, looking at how courts strike a 
balance between domestic laws and international laws. Most of the literature in 
South Africa deals with the relationship between extradition and death penalty and 
where torture is discussed it is done in passing. The researcher is not aware of any 
work that covers the recent development from South African Courts on the issue of 
the approaches these courts have taken to protect the right to freedom from torture 
in extradition cases. This study will fill that gap. 
 
It is critical to note that even in cases where extradition has been denied on the basis 
of death penalty, this has not been deemed just because the death penalty will be 
imposed but rather because the death penalty would be a violation of the right to 
human dignity. Other applicants have claimed that extradition would subject them to 
unfair trial practices in the requesting state34. 
 
6 Research methodology 
This research used desktop methodology as part of its research on the topic of 
extradition law. Relevant primary and secondary sources on extradition were relied 
                                                          
34
The Government of South Africa v Shrien Dewani (Unreported case, City of Westminster 
Magistrates' Court, sitting at Belmarsh Magistrates' Court, 10 Aug 2011). Dewani's appeal against the 
extradition order to the High Court was dismissed on 30 March 2012. The High Court, however, 
temporarily halted his extradition to South Africa on the grounds that it would worsen his mental 
health condition and make it more difficult to get him into a position where he was fit to plead. The 
court found that it would be in the interests of justice to facilitate his recovery so that the trial could 
proceed sooner rather than later. Greenhill S ''We just want the truth': Agony of murdered Anni 
Dewani's family after her husband's extradition to South Africa is temporarily halted on 
mental health grounds', 2012. Available on www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2122643/Shrien-Dewani-
extradition-haltedmental-health-grounds.html( accessed on the 9 of June 2012). 
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on. The primary sources included international law and domestic law. Domestic law 
included the Constitution, the Extradition Act, other relevant pieces of legislation, as 
well as case law.  International law included international treaties and customary 
international law. Leading text-books, law journal articles, and internet websites on 
the topic were also referred to as secondary sources.  
 
7 Chapter overview 
This research paper consists of five chapters namely: 
 Chapter one is the introduction to the research paper, it outlines the problem 
statement and gives brief over view to the arguments of this paper  
 
Chapter two focuses on meaning of extradition and a brief historical perspective on 
extradition law in South Africa. It specifically focuses on the Extradition Act and its 
procedures.  
 
 Chapter three looks at torture: South African obligations, international laws and 
domestic laws with regards to the right to freedom from torture.  
 
 Chapter four, deals with case law on extradition and the protection of human rights. 
This chapter looks at the development of South Africa from the apartheid era into 
constitutionalism. 
 
Chapter five consists of a conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO: EXTRADITION AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
EXTRADITION LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
2.1. Introduction 
In South Africa extradition procedures are governed and regulated by the Extradition 
Act, (the Act).35 Extradition is an official surrender of a suspect or a convicted 
individual who is a fugitive from justice by one state on whose territory he is found to 
another state where he is accused or has been convicted of a crime or crimes.36 The 
suspect is transferred to the requesting state in which the alleged offence took place 
for the purpose of criminal prosecution or the execution of a sentence37. The latter 
case should be distinguished from the issue of the transfer of sentenced persons 
whose discussion falls outside the scope of this thesis.38The Act serves three 
purposes39, first it serves as an enabling act for entering into treaties in accordance 
with certain guidelines40. This should be understood against the background that 
generally for international treaties to become part of South African law, they have to 
be domesticated through enabling legislation.41 Secondly the Act provides for the 
procedure to be followed in the execution of extradition requests42. And thirdly, the 
Act provides for the manner in which persons extradited to South Africa should be 
dealt with43. The main goal to be achieved by extradition is to secure the return of a 
suspect to the state where they allegedly committed the offence. Thus extradition is 
                                                          
35
Extradition Act 67 of 1962. 
36
 Dugard J, International law: A South African Perspective 4ed (2011) 214. 
37
Dugard International Law 214. 
38
 For the discussion of the issue of the transfer of sentenced persons between countries see The 
International Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Criminal Justice Handbook Series (2012) 10. 
39
Extradition Act 67 of 1962. 
40
Section 2 of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962. 
41
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC). Also see section 231 
of the Constitution of South Africa 1996. 
42
Sections 3-17. 
43
Sections 19-20. 
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one of the ways44 through which states cooperate in criminal matters and it is 
invoked to ensure that people do not escape from justice.  
 
Every single extradition is regarded as an agreement under international law. 
However, international law does not recognise any general duty on the part of a state 
to surrender suspects or criminals.45 There are at least two ways through which 
extradition can be achieved. The first is that two states may conclude bilateral 
extradition agreements. South Africa has, for example, concluded bilateral 
extradition agreements with countries such as Lesotho46, China47, and Algeria48. The 
second way is by a state ratifying or acceding to a multilateral extradition treaty or 
treaties49. Examples of multilateral treaties include the Convention for the 
Suppression of Hijacking,50 which allows for the extradition of a person alleged to 
have committed an offense under the Convention. The second example is the 
European Convention on Extradition,51 and the United Nations Convention against 
Torture. Accordingly article 4 (f) of the Southern African Development Community 
Protocol on Extradition provides that, extradition will be refused if the person is in 
prejudice of torture. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide article 7 (2) places a binding obligation on all parties to this Convention 
                                                          
44
 The other ways through which states cooperate in criminal matters include deportation. However, 
these are beyond the scope of this paper. 
45
Sanders AJGM “Extradition” in The Law of South Africa (vol 10) (1983). In terms of the European 
Convention on Extradition, Article 1 provides for an obligation to extradite:Article 1 – Obligation to 
extradite “The Contracting Parties undertake to surrender to each other, subject to the provisions and 
conditions laid down in this Convention, all persons against whom the competent authorities of the 
requesting Party are proceeding for an offence or who are wanted by the said authorities for the 
carrying out of a sentence or detention order”. 
46
 Government Gazette 26375 of 28 May 2004. 
47
Entered into force on 17 November 2004. 
48
Approval to ratify 11 November 2002 but not yet in force. 
49
 One example of such multilateral treaty is the Convention for the Suppression of Hijacking that 
allows for the extradition of a person alleged to have committed an offense under this Convention. 
50
 Hague Convention 14 October 1971. 
51
European Convention on Extradition CET NO 024. 
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to grant extradition in accordance with their domestic laws. Article 14 of the Great 
Lakes Protocol on Genocide sets out legal basis for extradition.  
 
2.1.1 Brief historical background to extradition 
In the early 19th century the focus of extradition was on a common serious offence 
due to the nature of such crimes as they replaced political offences as crimes 
dominating to the instability of a state52. In the 20th century there was a pattern to 
exclude political offences in extradition treaties. This, however, changed due to the 
increase of international terrorism53. 
 
During the early 19th century extradition law in South Africa was based on British law. 
During this period, a distinction was drawn between extradition involving members of 
the Commonwealth on the one hand and extradition which did not involve members 
of the Commonwealth on the other hand. The Fugitive Offender Act of 188154 
applied to extradition to countries in the Commonwealth and the British Extradition 
Acts from 1870 to 190655 governed extradition to countries outside the 
Commonwealth. During the 20th century but before South Africa gained 
independence, England granted the Union56 the authority to conclude treaties on its 
own behalf independent of Britain57. 
 
                                                          
52
 Joubert The Law of South Africa: Executive Authority to Fundamental Rights (1993) 244.   
53
Gilbert G, Aspects of Extradition Law: International Studies in Human Rights (Volume 17) (1991).  
54
 In 1966 the Fugitive Offenders Act was replaced by a ‘Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive 
Offenders within the Commonwealth’. 
55
Dugard International Law, 215. 
56
 This allowed the British Government to extend extradition treaties entered into between the British 
Government and other states to British colonies. After South Africa acquired full treaty making power 
the South African Government was able to enter into treaties with other states on its own behalf.  
57
Dugard International Law, 215. 
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In 1961 South Africa became a republic. It introduced the apartheid system and as a 
result gave up its membership to the Commonwealth. The effect of this was that 
South Africa forfeited its membership of all extradition agreements that had been 
previously entered into with Commonwealth countries58. This, however, did not affect 
the status of these agreements between these states as they continued being valid 
and enforceable. During this period South Africa had introduced the apartheid 
system and was politically isolated and as a result few extradition agreements were 
concluded with the neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
and states such as Israel and the Republic of China59. In the circumstances in which 
there was not an extradition agreement between South Africa and a requesting state, 
a special arrangement had to be made, on the basis of the Act, so as the suspect or 
offender could be returned to the requesting state60.  
 
The apartheid regime ended in 1994 and as such South Africa became part of the 
international community again. As a result, on 20 July 1994 South Africa was 
readmitted into the Commonwealth.61 However, by 1994 there had been 
developments at the Commonwealth level and as extradition treaties previously 
concluded were now dealt with in terms of the London Scheme on Extradition within 
the Commonwealth62. In terms of this Scheme, Commonwealth states agreed to 
uphold national extradition legislation that was in line with the Scheme. Thus article 
22 of the Scheme provides that:  
 Each country will take, subject to its constitution, any legislative and othersteps which may be 
necessary or expedient in the circumstances to facilitateand effectuate -(a) the transit through 
its territory of a person sought who is being extraditedunder this Scheme;(b) the delivery of 
                                                          
58
 Dugard J International Law: A South African Perspective (2000) 156.   
59
Proust  K “International Co-operation: A Commonwealth Perspective” (2003) 297.   
60
Dugard International Law, 215. 
61
Proust “International Co-operation” 297. 
62
 The London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth incorporating the amendments 
agreed at Kingstown in November 2002. 
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property found in the possession of a person sought at thetime of arrest which may be 
material evidence of the extradition offence;and(c) the proof of warrants, certificates of 
conviction, depositions and otherdocuments. 
 
The Act63 was amended in 1996 to give more power and authority to the President 
(this will be illustrated shortly). Before the amendment, the Act provided for only two 
situations in which extradition might take place. The first was governed by section 
3(1) of the Act and applies to any person who is accused or convicted of an 
extraditable offence committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign state which is a 
party to an extradition agreement with South Africa. The requested person is liable to 
be surrendered to the requesting state, subject to the provisions of the Act in 
accordance with the terms of such agreement. The second basis for extradition was 
governed by section 3(2) of the Act prior to the 1996 amendment.  Section 3(2) 
provides that:  
“Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within thejurisdiction 
of a foreign State which is not a party to an extradition agreement shall beliable to be 
surrendered to such foreign State, if the President has in writingconsented to his or her being 
so surrendered” 
 
The 1996 amendment created a third situation in which a person might become 
liable for extradition. In terms of the amendment, extradition is possible where the 
foreign state which requests the surrender has been “designated” by the President. 
Thus, the President has capacity to designate a particular foreign state as a state 
with which extradition proceedings may be concluded.  The current position is that 
extradition can take place on the basis of any one of the three situations mentioned 
above. In terms of section 2(1) (b) read with section 3(3) of the Act, the President 
has designated the Republic of Ireland, Zimbabwe, Namibia and the United 
Kingdom. South Africa has subsequently entered into extradition agreements with 
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Canada64, Australia65, Lesotho66, United States of America67, Botswana68, Malawi69, 
Swaziland70, Israel71, Egypt72, Algeria73, Nigeria74, China75 and India76. In 2003 South 
Africa ratified the European Convention on Extradition which resulted in extradition 
agreement with fifty other states77. This clearly indicated development and growth in 
terms of the process of extradition from its historical background to its modern 
international law78. 
 
2.2. General principles of Extradition 
Extradition, like any other form of international cooperation, is based on a set of 
principles. These principles are found in the Extradition Act and in the bilateral and 
multilateral agreements that South Africa has signed or ratified. These principles will 
now be dealt with. 
 
The Extradition Act endorses the principle of reciprocity. Section 2(1) (a) provides 
that the President may enter into extradition treaties with foreign states which 
provide “… for the surrender on a reciprocal basis of persons accused or 
                                                          
64
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65
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Katz “The Incorporation of Extradition Agreements” (2003) SACJ 314. 
78
This convention has been invoked recently by the South African authorities to seek the extradition to 
South Africa of a person from Cyprus who allegedly committed murder in South Africa. However, the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus held that the condition of assurance was not satisfied as the court was not 
satisfied that the appellant would not be killed in prison if extradited to South Africa. The Court did not 
grant extradition. Fenwick S ‘Cyprus extradition’ available at  http://cyprus-mail.com (accessed 29 
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convicted…” of certain offences. Dugard has argued that for section 2(1)(a) to be 
given effect “the requesting state must have jurisdiction to subject  the offender to 
criminal proceedings in respect of the offence for which his or her surrender is 
sought”79. It should be recalled that this requirement does not, however, imply that 
the offender must have been present in the requesting state at the time the offence 
was committed, or that every essential action of the offence must have taken place 
in the requesting state80. The Extradition Act provides for this principle in section 2(1) 
in relation to extradition treaties. With regards to extradition in the absence of a 
treaty section 3(2) of the Act provides a way forward. 
 
When extradition is successful, the extradited person will be governed by the laws of 
the requesting state. However, those laws may not be invoked to try or punish the 
extradited person for an offence which was not envisaged in the extradition treaty. 
This is known as the principle of speciality81 which is provided for in section 2 (3) (c) 
is to the effect that an agreement entered into by the President will be of no force 
unless the domestic legislation of the other party or the treaty provides for the 
application of this principle. The principle of speciality is “aimed at ensuring that an 
offender is not tried or punished because of a non-returnable offence”82. Section 2(3) 
(c), makes this principle applicable to extradition agreements to which South Africa is 
a party. Section 19 of the Act83 applies to the prosecution of persons extradited to 
South Africa. It provides that an extradited person may not be detained or tried for 
any offence other than the offence in respect of which extradition was requested, 
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Dugard International Law, 220. 
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unless the person was returned to the requested state or permission was obtained 
from the state. 
 
International extradition treaties are in many circumstances applicable to a restricted 
scope of offences84. These offences are always specified in the relevant extradition 
treaty or treaties85. The Act embodies this principle in section 2(1) by providing that 
an agreement must provide for the surrender of “persons accused or convicted of the 
commission… of offences specified in such agreements…” The extradition 
agreements which South Africa has signed with other countries provide that 
extradition will not take place if the offence mentioned in the extradition request is of 
a political nature86. Although the Act deals with offences of a political character, it 
does not contain an express prohibition against extradition for political offences. 
Section 11 of the Act authorises the Minister of Justice to prevent the surrender of an 
offender for a political offence by cancelling the warrant or ordering a discharge87. 
This should be understood against the background that if a person has fled to South 
Africa after committing an offence of a political nature in his country of nationality or 
citizenship, that person qualifies for refugee status in terms of South Africa’s national 
and international law obligations.88 
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Dugard International Law, 218. 
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2.3.1. Foreign states 
Section 231(1) of the Constitution provides that the negotiating and signing of all 
international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive. The power to 
enter into an agreement vests in the President89. Such a treaty will enter into force 
on its publication by proclamation in the Government Gazette90. An extradition 
request received in terms of such a treaty must be handed to the Minister of 
Justice91. The Minister will then notify the magistrate of the fact that a request has 
been received92. South Africa requests the requesting state to provide a prima 
facie93case of guilt against the offender before granting extradition94.  
 
A request to the Minister of Justice through diplomatic channels must be filed by the 
foreign state which requests South Africa to extradite the offender in terms of the 
extradition agreement. When the offender is arrested, they must be brought before 
the magistrate. The arrest and detention’s aim is to conduct an extradition enquiry. 
This enquiry is regarded as judicial and not administrative proceedings. Extradition 
proceedings are sui generis in character hence they cannot be described as criminal 
proceedings as they are modelled upon a preparatory examination95. At the enquiry, 
section 10 of the Act applies. It provides that: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1998 was enacted to give effect within South Africa to the relevant international legal instruments and 
principles relating to refugees and to provide for the reception of asylum seekers. Also see Minister of 
Home Affair v Watchenuka 2004 (4) SA (SCA) para 2. 
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Section 2 (1) of the Extradition Act.Harksen v The President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (5) 
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If upon consideration of the evidence adduced at the enquiry referred to in section9 (4) (a) 
and (b) (i) the magistrate finds that the person brought before him or her is liable to be 
surrendered to the foreign State concerned and, in the case where suchperson is accused of 
an offence, that there is sufficient evidence to warrant aprosecution for the offence in the 
foreign State concerned, the magistrate shall issue an order committing such person to prison 
to await the Minister's decision with regard to his or her surrender; at the same time informing 
such person that he or she may within 15 days appeal against such order to the Supreme 
Court.(2) For purposes of satisfying himself or herself that there is sufficient evidence 
towarrant a prosecution in the foreign State the magistrate shall accept as conclusiveproof a 
certificate which appears to him or her to be issued by an appropriate authority in charge of 
the prosecution in the foreign State concerned, stating that it has sufficient evidence at its 
disposal to warrant the prosecution of the person concerned.(3) If the magistrate finds that the 
evidence does not warrant the issue of an order ofcommittal or that the required evidence is 
not forthcoming within a reasonable time, he shall discharge the person brought before 
him.(4) The magistrate issuing the order of committal shall forthwith forward to theMinister a 
copy of the record of the proceedings together with such report as he maydeem necessary. 
 
 
The liability to surrender any person accused or convicted of an offence committed in 
a foreign state with which no extradition treaty exists, may be considered in terms of 
the Extradition Act96. The consent of the President is the only additional requirement. 
Apart from the consent of the President the procedure of executing the request runs 
the same course as in the case of a request made in terms of an extradition treaty. 
 
In the case of S v Khanyisile and Another97 , the Court had to determine whether 
Botswana was a foreign or an associated state. The Court noted that it was 
important to determine this issue as different sections and different procedures apply 
depending on the classification of the state requesting extradition. If a state is a 
foreign state, then the inquiry must be conducted in terms of section 10 of the Act by 
a magistrate but the final decision, whether or not to extradite the person concerned, 
is that of the Minister of Justice98.  The Court, in making the decision, looked at the 
precedent of the Shoniwa99 case and the Tsebe100 case (this case will be discussed 
later in this thesis) and noted that there was a discrepancy between these two 
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judgements as they differed in their outcome. The Court noted that the treaty 
discussed in the Shoniwa case was the same which is applicable to the appellants. It 
therefore does not provide for the endorsement of warrants issued in either  
Botswana or South Africa on a reciprocal basis as provided for in section 6 of the 
Act, which section defines what an associated state is. The court therefore 
concluded that Botswana is a foreign state and not an associated state101. 
 
2.3.2. Associated states 
An associated state is a state with whom South Africa has an extradition agreement 
which provides for the reciprocal execution of warrants of arrest102. The process to 
be followed is initiated by submitting the warrant of arrest which was issued in the 
associated state to the magistrate. If the magistrate is satisfied that the warrant was 
lawfully issued, he or she will endorse it for execution103. 
 
A person who is arrested in the course of the execution of an endorsed warrant must 
be brought before a magistrate as soon as possible in order for an enquiry to be 
held104. The procedure to be followed at the enquiry is similar to that of a preparatory 
examination105. At the enquiry the provisions of section 12,106will apply if the person 
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was arrested in the execution of a warrant of arrest endorsed in terms of section 6 107. 
It may transpire that, the person is liable to be surrendered to the associated state 
but that the surrender is undesirable for some reason or another. In these 
circumstances the Extradition Act provides that the magistrate must also decide 
whether the surrender would be unjust and unreasonable or too severe a 
punishment by reason of the nature of the offence, or the surrender was not required 
in good faith or in the interest of justice108. In S v Williams109it was decided that the 
unreasonableness or severity of the sentence is not an obstruction but must appear 
upon consideration of all relevant facts110, and that the sentence which is likely to be 
imposed must be wholly inappropriate or unconscionable111. The question of whether 
or not the principle laid down in S v Williams is still applicable will be dealt with later 
in this thesis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
make such order as to him or her seems just if he or she is of the opinion that- (i) by reason of the 
trivial nature of the offence or by reason of the surrender not being required in good faith or in the 
interests of justice, or that for any other reason it would, having regard for the distance, the facilities 
for communication and to all the circumstances of the case, be unjust or unreasonable or too severe a 
punishment to surrender the person concerned; or (ii) the person concerned will be prosecuted or 
punished or prejudiced at his or her trial in the associated State by reason of his or her gender, race, 
religion, nationality or political opinion. (3) If the magistrate finds that the evidence does not warrant 
the issue of an order under subsection (1) or that the required evidence is not forthcoming within a 
reasonable time and the delay is not caused by the person brought before him or her, he or she shall 
discharge that person. 
107
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The requested state on the other hand may also surrender the individual only after 
ensuring that there exists an extradition procedure which works both on an 
international and a domestic plane112. Although the interplay of the two may not be 
severable, they are distinct. On the international plane, a request from one foreign 
State to another for the extradition of a particular individual and the response to the 
request will be governed by the rules of international law. At play are the relations 
between States113. However, before the requested State may surrender the 
requested individual, there must be compliance with its own domestic laws114. 
 
In Shonwa v S115, the Court had to establish whether Botswana was an associated 
state or foreign state as an application for extradition was made by the Republic of 
Botswana, communicating the request through the diplomatic channels to the 
Minister of Justice as required by section 4 of the Extradition Act116. The appellants 
contended that the order of the court a quofinding that they were extraditable was 
wrong, because the extradition enquiry should have been held in terms of section 12 
of the Extradition Act and not section 10 because Botswana is an associated state 
as contemplated by the Act117. The court held that the Act defines an associated 
state as “any foreign state in respect of which section 6 of the Act applies”118. 
Section 6 deals with warrants of arrest issued in certain foreign states in Africa and 
the crux thereof lies in the reciprocal endorsements of warrants for arrest that was 
issued in a foreign state119. The treaty on extraditions between the republics of South 
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Africa and Botswana does not provide for the endorsement of warrants issued in 
either state on a reciprocal basis as provided for in section 6 of the Act. Therefore 
accordingly Botswana is a foreign state120. The Tsebe121 case, however, was of the 
opinion that Botswana was an associated state. The Court held that: 
 
Section 12 applies directly to the facts of this case. Section 12(1) is comparable in wording to 
section 10(1) save for the fact that section 12 deals with the extradition of a foreigner from an 
“associated State” as contemplated in section 9(4)(b) referred to above. Botswana is such an 
associated State by virtue of the Extradition Treaty concluded with South Africa as 
contemplated in section 6 of the Act. In terms of section 12(1) the magistrate conducting the 
enquiry concerning a foreigner from an associated state who has committed an offence may 
surrender such person to such state subject to the provisions of subsection (2). In terms of 
this latter subsection the magistrate is given similar powers to that held by the Minister to 
refuse the extradition of a foreigner under section 11(b)(i) to (iv)
122
. 
 
The Khanyisile123 case, however, differs from this decision as the Court found that 
Botswana was a foreign state. What is clear is that South African courts have 
handed down conflicting decisions on whether a state in question, in this case 
Botswana, is a foreign state or an associated state. In my opinion, the correct view is 
that Botswana is a foreign state. This is clearly supported by a literal interpretation of 
section 10 of the Extradition Act. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the 
question of whether or not the state in question is an associated or foreign state is 
not what is important. What is important is whether the extradited person’s rights will 
be protected in the extradition process. 
 
2.4  Incorporating the international treaty into domestic law. 
An extradition treaty between South Africa and another state can be legally and 
validly entered into according to section 2 (1) of the Extradition Act read together 
with section 231 (1) of the Constitution. Section 231(1) provides that the negotiation 
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and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national 
executive and section 231(2) of the Constitutionstates that an international 
agreement binds South Africa internationally after it has been approved by resolution 
in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Incorporation 
of the treaty into domestic law is governed by section 231(4) of the Constitution. 
Section 231(4) states that an international treaty becomes law when it is enacted into 
law by national legislation but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has 
been approved by parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitutionor an act of parliament. If the extradition agreement is not validly 
incorporated into the domestic law it cannot be given effect, despite the extradition 
agreements being valid on international level124. 
 
The Constitutional Court recently dealt with the issue of the relationship between 
national law on the one hand and international law on the other hand and in 
particular the meaning of section 231 of the Constitution. In Glenister v President of 
the Republic of South Africa125, Justice Ngcobo held that 
The constitutional scheme of section 231 is deeply rooted in the separation of powers, in 
particular the checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. It contemplates 
three legal steps that may be taken in relation to an international agreement, with each step 
producing different legal consequences. First, it assigns to the national executive the authority 
to negotiate and sign international agreements
126
. But an international agreement signed by 
the executive does not automatically bind the Republic unless it is an agreement of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature
127
. To produce that result, it requires, second, the 
approval by resolution of Parliament
128
.  
 
Court further noted that: 
The approval of an agreement by Parliament does not, however, make it law in the Republic 
unless it is a self-executing agreement that has been approved by Parliament, which 
becomes law in the Republic upon such approval unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution 
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or an Act of Parliament. Otherwise, and third, an international agreement becomes law in the 
Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation
129
. 
 
The approval of an international agreement, under section 231(2) of the Constitution, 
conveys South Africa‘s intention, in its capacity as a sovereign state, to be bound at 
the international level by the provisions of the agreement. As the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties provides, the act of approving a convention is an 
“international act… whereby a State establishes on the international plane its 
consent to be bound by a treaty130”. The approval of an international agreement 
under section 231(2), therefore, constitutes an undertaking at the international level, 
as between South Africa and other states, to take steps to comply with the 
substance of the agreement. This undertaking will, generally speaking, be given 
effect by either incorporating the agreement into South African law or taking other 
steps to bring our laws in line with the agreement to the extent they do not already 
comply131.  
Justice Ngcobo concluded that 
In our constitutional system, the making of international agreements falls within the province 
of the executive, whereas the ratification and the incorporation of the international agreement 
into our domestic law fall within the province of Parliament. The approval of an international 
agreement by the resolution of Parliament does not amount to its incorporation into our 
domestic law. Under our Constitution, therefore, the actions of the executive in negotiating 
and signing an international agreement do not result in a binding agreement. Legislative 
action is required before an international agreement can bind the Republic
132
.  
 
In Harksen v The President of the Republic of South Africa133, the German 
government requested the South African government to extradite the applicant, Mr 
Jurgen Harksen, to Germany to stand trial for allegedly committing fraud in 
Germany. The Cape High Court held that he could be extradited to Germany. Mr 
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Harksen asked the Constitutional Court to set aside the High Court’s judgement 
which had upheld the validity of section 3(2) of the Extradition Act. His argument 
before the Constitutional Court was based on section 7(2) of the Constitution, which 
obliges all organs of the state to protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the absence of an extradition treaty between South Africa 
and the requesting state, section 3(2) of the Extradition Act empowers the President 
to consent, in writing, to the extradition or surrender of person to such a state. On the 
basis of section 3(2) of the Act President Mandela consented to Mr Harksen’s 
surrender to Germany. Against that background, the then Minister of Justice invoked 
the provisions of the Act, and a magistrate held an inquiry and found that there was 
sufficient evidence against Harksen to justify his extradition. Harksen brought 
proceedings in the Cape High Court designed to set aside the magistrate’s findings. 
A number of challenges were raised. Although Harksen succeeded on a ground of 
review relating to aspects of the procedure followed, the constitutional issues argued 
by his counsel were dismissed.  
 
Harksen first submitted that section 3(2) of the Extradition Act was unconstitutional 
as the President’s consent under section 3(2) constitutes the conclusion of an 
international agreement which was not made subject to parliamentary approval as 
mandated by section 231(2) of the Constitution. Harksen argued in the alternative 
that the failure, in this instance, to subject the ‘international agreement’ to the 
constitutional requirements of parliamentary approval and legislative incorporation, 
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as provided for in section 231(2) and (4) of the Constitution, made his extradition 
process unlawful and invalid134.  
 
Justice Goldstone, with whose judgment the entire Court concurred, held that the 
presidential consent under section 3(2) had domestic application only, serving 
merely to bring the requested individual within the ambit of the Extradition Act135. As 
a domestic act, the President’s consent was never intended to create international 
legal rights and obligations and did not constitute an international agreement136. The 
constitutional requirements of section 231 relating to international agreements thus 
do not apply.  
 
In the President of the Republic of South Africa v Quagliani137 case, the Court was 
also faced with the challenge of enforceability of agreements in South African 
domestic law. The applicants argued that the agreement between South Africa and 
the United States of America was accordingly not law in the Republic, with the 
consequence that extradition to and from the United States could not be undertaken. 
Their argument was based on section 231 (2) and 231 (4) of the Constitution. The 
applicants contented that the agreement had not become law in the Republic 
because it had not been enacted into national legislation, that its provisions were not 
self-executing138. 
 
With regards to the validity of the agreement, the applicants argued that the 
agreement was invalid as the President had delegated his own responsibilities to 
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members of his cabinet. In determining the validity of the agreement, the Court 
looked at section 2(1) of the Act and section 231(1) of the Constitution. The Court 
held that: 
The power conferred upon the President in section 2 of the Act must nowbe read with section 
231 of the Constitution which provides that the nationalexecutive bears the constitutional 
responsibility to negotiate and sign treaties.When the President decides to enter into an 
extradition agreement in terms ofsection 2 of the Act, he does so as head of the national 
executive. Given theprovisions of section 231 of the Constitution, it is not improper for the 
President,once the decision to enter into the treaty has been made by the President, to 
conferother formal aspects relating to the accession to the treaty on other members of 
thenational executive. It is important that these provisions should not be applied in 
aformalistic manner that will impair the ability of the national executive tofunction. The facts 
that I have set out above make it plain that the President diddecide that the Agreement should 
be entered into in terms of section 231 of theConstitution as Presidential Minute No. 428 
expressly states. The fact that in thesame minute the President empowered the Minister (who 
is a member of thenational executive) to sign the Agreement and take the necessary steps to 
ensurethat the Agreement was formally concluded is entirely consistent with the 
powerconferred upon the national executive by section 231 of the Constitution.Similarly, the 
fact that the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs signed theinstruments of ratification is also 
consistent with the conferral of the power uponthe executive
139
. 
 
The court concluded that the agreement between South Africa and the United States 
was therefore valid.  
 
With regards to the argument of enforceability of the agreement in South African 
domestic law, the Court held that the legal question is whether the agreement 
becomes law in South Africa as contemplated by section 231 (4) of the Constitution. 
In answering this, the Court established two approaches. The first was that the 
agreement itself does not become binding in domestic law, but the international 
obligation the agreement encapsulates is given effect to by the provisions of the 
Act140. The second approach is that once the agreement has been entered into as 
specified in sections 2 and 3 of the Act, it becomes law in South Africa as 
contemplated by section 231 (4) of the Constitution without further legislation by 
Parliament141. The Court concluded that whichever approach is used, no further 
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enactment by Parliament is required to make extradition between South Africa and 
the United States permissible in South African law.142 
 
2.5 Extradition law and Human Rights. 
It is now necessary to have a look at how the issue of human rights is addressed in 
South African extradition law. This should be understood against the backdrop that 
the South African Constitution has a comprehensive Bill of Rights143, and South 
Africa has signed144 and ratified145 or acceded to international and regional human 
rights treaties. The Extradition Act and the relevant treaties show that the most 
significant thing is that the extradited person’s right to a fair trial will not be violated in 
the requesting state. Sections 11 (b) (iv) and 12 (2) (ii) of the Extradition Act provides 
that an offender will not be surrendered to the  requesting state if they will be 
prejudiced at the trial by reason of his or her gender, race, religion nationality or 
political opinion146. Section 9(3) of the Constitution of South Africa further prohibits 
the state not to unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
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culture, language and birth. The Extradition Act grounds are not exhaustive or a 
closed list. They should be read in line with section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
 
In Shonwa v S147, South Africa applied for the extradition of the appellants to the 
Republic of Botswana to stand trial on the three counts of theft of motor vehicle. The 
appellants challenged the extradition order, contending that they will not have a fair 
trial in Botswana should they be extradited. Their argument was that their right to 
legal representation will be violated. In support of their argument, they submitted that 
there was no government-funded organisation that can assist them in their trial in 
court, and that this will not be in the interest of justice.148 In resolving the issues 
before it, the Court made a few points that should be examined in order to determine 
whether extradition would infringe the suspect’s human rights.  
 
The Court firstly noted that an extradition enquiry was not a criminal trial and the 
subjects of an enquiry are not accused persons149.  That an order that the appellants 
are extraditable is not a sentence and therefore the fair trial rights as contemplated in 
section 35(3)150 of the Constitution are not relevant to an extradition enquiry and 
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therefore procedural fairness is what should prevail151. Extradition agreements 
should be accommodated as far as possible. The Court added that the magistrate 
conducting an enquiry in terms of section 10 of the Act has no power to consider 
whether the constitutional rights of the person sought may be infringed upon 
extradition, because that aspect should be considered by the Minister in terms of 
section 11 of the Act and that the decision of the Minister is subject to judicial 
control.152 The court held that when the application of a national law would infringe 
the sovereignty of another state that would ordinarily be inconsistent with and not 
sanctioned by international law.153 
 
The Court concluded that it was speculative to argue that if no legal representation at 
state cost is afforded, the trial that follow will necessary be unfair. It was without 
merit to assume that unrepresented accused do not receive fair trials154, and that 
there was not any evidence to indicate that the trial that will follow would necessarily 
be unfair. The Minister under section 11 of the Act also has the opportunity to look at 
the appellants’ concerns regarding the fair trial issue and may refuse their surrender 
on that basis.155 
 
In the Khanyisile156 case the appellants contested their extradition to Botswana, as 
they submitted that Botswana’s sentence for the offence of armed robbery carried 
corporal punishment. The appellants further contented that corporal punishment is a 
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form of torture which is outlawed in South Africa.157 In this regard, the Court found 
that robbery was an extraditable offence in terms of section 3 (2) of the Act. 
Furthermore the Court held that the penalty for robbery was imprisonment exceeding 
twelve months as required by article 2 of the treaty, and thus capital punishment was 
not applicable. The court thereof dismissed the appeal158. 
 
The case of The Government of South Africa v Shrien Dewani159 is also noteworthy 
in this regard. In November 2010, while the United Kingdom citizen, Dewani, and his 
wife, Anni, were on honeymoon in Cape Town, South Africa, Anni was shot and 
killed during a hi-jacking. Dewani soon thereafter left South Africa with the 
permission of the South African law enforcement agency. It was later alleged during 
the sentencing of one of the perpetrators involved in the hijacking that Dewani had 
arranged for the killing of his wife. The motive for the killing is unknown, although 
unproven allegations have been made to the effect that it was a forced marriage 
which did not carry Dewani's approval and withdrawal from the marriage would have 
resulted in his being disowned by his family. Dewani was arrested in the United 
Kingdom and released on bail pending an extradition application. He denied 
involvement in the killing of his wife and alleged that on being extradited to South 
Africa his human rights would be infringed as he would be in danger of gang-related 
sexual violence in prison. The application by the South African government for 
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Dewani's extradition, however, was successful. This was because, inter alia, the 
South African government managed to convince the United Kingdom court that his 
rights, including the right to a fair trial and to be detained in humane prison 
conditions, would be protected in South Africa. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Dugard argues that the extradition process is the most effective procedure available 
to return an offender to the state seeking his prosecution160. However, the issue of 
human rights is now critical in the extradition process. In South Africa, a person will 
not be extradited to another country where there is reason to believe that his 
fundamental rights will be violated. Other countries will also not extradite a person to 
South Africa if that person’s fundamental rights would be violated. This is evidenced 
from some of the cases discussed above and those that will be discussed below. 
Practice from other parts of the world also shows that human rights have to be 
respected in the extradition process. The European Convention on Extradition to 
which South Africa became a party in 2003 recognises the issue of human rights in 
the extradition process. Jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights 
has also shown the importance of human rights in the extradition process. 161 
Extradition is therefore concerned with the balancing of the offender’s human rights 
and the need for effective enforcement of criminal law162. 
 
It is important that extradition is understood not only as a governmental function, as it 
also involves the courts. Extradition requests may therefore result in courts in the 
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requested state scrutinising the legal system of the requesting state. This is done in 
order to ensure that all procedures are respected and all duties and obligations are 
adhered to so as to prevent any infringement of the extradited person’s human 
rights. In the next chapter I will deal with the issue of the right to freedom from torture 
in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM 
TORTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
South African history shows that torture has been used in the country for many 
years.163 However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with the history of the 
use of torture in South Africa. Torture was also widely used by the apartheid 
government.164 Because of South Africa’s political history, the parties which were 
involved in the drafting of the Constitution raised the issue of torture and the 
significance of including the right to freedom from torture as a clause into the 
Constitution. Consequently, the right to freedom from torture was included both in 
the interim Constitution and the final Constitution.165 However, evidence from our 
courts166 and from different credible sources show that torture is still being practiced 
in South Africa167. However this thesis is concerned with the right to freedom from 
torture in the context of extradition. Before I deal with the issue of the right to 
freedom from torture and extradition in South Africa, I shall briefly first highlight 
South Africa’s international, regional and national obligations to prevent torture.  
 
3.2 International treaties on torture 
Torture is a serious violation of human rights and is strictly prohibited by international 
law. International law prohibits torture and other forms of inhuman and degrading 
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treatment, which cannot be accepted under any circumstances. Prohibition against 
torture is therefore absolute and non derogable168, this means that no exceptional 
circumstance whatsoever may be invoked by a state party to justify acts of torture in 
any territory under its jurisdiction169.  
 
 Prohibition of torture belongs to general international law since it is codified in 
international treaty law and in international customary law170. Some of the treaties 
which prohibit torture include the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
(article 7), European Convention on Human Rights ECHR171 (article 3), the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights172 (article 5), the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights (article 13), and the American Convention on Human Rights (article 5). These 
treaties have been ratified by many States. Moreover, the prohibition of torture forms 
part of international customary law as well. Based on these facts one could say that 
this non-derogable right find acceptance by the international community of States as 
a whole. However, in order to become a norm of jus cogens the rule must be 
accepted by the international community of States as a ‘peremptory rule’. In other 
words, a very fundamental norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character173. In the Furundzija174 the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
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Former Yugoslavia175 stated that the prohibition of torture has evolved into a norm of 
jus cogens.176The recognition of the prohibition of torture as belonging tojus cogens 
does not only have the effect of making it binding upon States which have not ratified 
international human rights instruments, it also means that no derogation is permitted 
by any State, not even during the times of a public emergency177. 
 
Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment defines torture. Apart from the provisions of the 
Convention, torture and other forms of inhuman and cruel treatment or punishment 
have been prohibited in terms of codified international law since at least 1948. 
International rights instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,178 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,179 the Convention 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Geneva180 and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court181, in one way or the other, prohibit torture. This 
prohibition is absolute and non-derogable, meaning that no act amounting to torture 
or severe ill-treatment can be justified in any way or form, or for any reason 
whatsoever. 
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This prohibition relates both to physical pain and mental suffering. Even though there 
is no definition provided for CIDT (cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), the 
Committee against Torture invokes the concept of “degree of severity” to differentiate 
between torture from CIDT. This is clear from the Committee’s General Comment No 
2 where it state that  
The Committee recognizes that most States parties identify or define certain conduct as 
illtreatment in their criminal codes. In comparison to torture, ill-treatment may differ in the 
severity of pain and suffering and does not require proof of impermissible purposes. The 
Committee emphasizes that it would be a violation of the Convention to prosecute conduct 
solely as illtreatment where the elements of torture are also present
182
. 
 
However, Nowak and McArthur have argued that the Committee against Torture 
gives discretion to the courts to decide whether an act constitute cruel, inhuman, 
degrading treatment or punishment183. It should be recalled that the Committee 
against Torture has observed that in practice the distinction between torture and ill-
treatment might be difficult to be made as factors that lead to torture also lead to ill 
treatment.184 
 
Articles 2 and 4 of the Convention185 imposes obligation on the state parties. In 
terms of article 2, every state is required to take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in its territory. Under article 4, 
acts of torture must be offences under criminal law. Articles 5, 6 and 8 further require 
states to prosecute torture as an international offence. Article 3 stipulates that:  
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture 
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This article creates an unconditional obligation on state parties to ensure that a 
person is not expelled, returned or deported to another country where torture is likely 
to exist. Return is prohibited under all circumstances on an unconditional basis, 
provided there are substantial grounds of believing there would be a danger of 
torture. Article 17 of the Convention established the Committee against Torture. This 
Committee is empowered to, inter alia, to request the requested state to refuse 
extradition until the Committee has considered the request186.  
 
Torture is prohibited under article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which states "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." This 
provision cannot be suspended or limited even in times of emergency. The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child further the rights of acknowledges children and 
protects them from torture. Article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
provides that "no child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment". 
 
Torture can be considered as a crime against humanity187, or a war crime,188 or a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.189 The right to freedom from torture is 
absolute including during times of war. There is a duty to protect the life, health and 
safety of civilians and other non-combatants, including soldiers who are captured or 
who have laid down their arms. Torture of such protected persons is absolutely 
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forbidden. Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, for example, bans 
"violence of life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture" as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment." 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is the main African human rights 
instrument, and it stipulates in article 5 that "every individual shall have the right to 
the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his 
legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, 
slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited." It further notes the respect for dignity as an inherent in a human being. It  
was argued in S v Makwanyane190 that the rights to human dignity and life are 
entwined. The right to life is more than existence; it is a right to be treated as a 
human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished. 
Without life, there cannot be dignity191.  
 
According to the Mohamed case,192 the court made it clear that a person ought not 
be deported or extradited to another state where there was a real risk that his basic 
human rights would be violated in that state. Because South Africa is a party to the 
Convention against Torture193 which prohibits extradition where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that the extradited person will be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting state it has a 
duty not to violate its international obligations. The Convention against Torture and 
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Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prohibits the 
extradition as well as the deportation of a person to a state "where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture” and allows no derogation. The Committee against Torture has developed 
jurisprudence on Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. For example, it has 
recommended that countries such as Burundi194, Cameroon195 and Mauritius196, to 
ensure that domestic legislation does not permit the extradition of persons to 
countries where there are substantial grounds to believe that they would be 
subjected to torture. The Committee against Torture has concluded and made 
recommendations on the initial report of South Africa 2006. 
Under no circumstances should the State party expel, return or extradite a person to a State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that this person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. When determining the applicability of its non-refoulement obligations 
under article 3 of the Convention, the State party should examine thoroughly the merits of 
each individual case, ensure that adequate judicial mechanisms for the review of the decision 
are in place and ensure effective post-return monitoring arrangements.
197
 
 
Apart from international law, South Africa is also under a legal duty to protect and 
uphold the freedom from torture domestically. The prohibition on torture is to be 
enforced by both the municipal criminal law sanctions and international supervision.  
 
In the case of Soering v UK,198 Soering was a student in the United States of 
America. He was charged together with his girl friend of murder of the girl friends ’ 
parents. They both fled to Europe. Soering was arrested in England. He made a 
confession with the hope of being extradited to Germany as Germany had declared 
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death penalty unconstitutional. Britain granted conditional extradition of Soering to 
the USA. A complaint was filed under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights explained what amounted to inhuman or 
degrading treatment as  
“It depends on all the circumstances of the case…Furthermore, inherent in the whole of the 
Convention is a search for a balance between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. As 
movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international 
dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee 
abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for 
fugitives would not only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person 
but also tend to undermine the foundation of extradition. These considerations must also be 
included among the factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the 
notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in extradition cases”.
199
 
 
The Court upheld Soering’s claim that his extradition to face the death penalty 
constituted inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Art 3. The Court also 
stated that the state from which extradition is requested must take into account any 
potential violation of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights by authorities in the requesting state, regardless of whether or not the latter is 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights.200 
 
In the NG v Canada201 matter, the Human Rights Committee held that Canada had 
violated its obligations under Art 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Canada extradited NG to the United States where, if sentenced to death in 
California, he would be executed by gas asphyxiation and thus resulted in suffering 
which constituted cruel and inhuman treatment. The Human Rights Committee held 
that Canada should have foreseen that NG would be executed in this manner. 
Canada thus failed to comply with its obligations under the Covenant in the 
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extradition of NG to the United States. The Committee based its decision on the fact 
that execution by gas asphyxiation as a form of implementing the death penalty does 
not meet the requirement that capital punishment is required to be carried out in the 
manner which causes the least possible physical and mental suffering. The 
Committee concluded that even death penalty is a form of torture which can be used 
to obstruct extradition request. 
 
3.3 Domestic obligations 
 It is important to note that in S v Makwanyane,202 court held that even death penalty 
is a form of torture. Furthermore in Mohammed v President of the Republic of South 
Africa,203 the court made it clear that a person ought not be deported or extradited to 
another state where there is a risk that his basis human rights would be violated in 
that state. Using article 15 of the Convention against Torture, looking at cases on 
death penalty and some on deportation and referring to the jurisprudence from the 
ECHR, I will argue that South Africa has an obligation not to extradite if there is 
reasonable grounds to believe that the extradited individual will be subjected to 
torture. 
 
Acts of torture and other acts of inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or 
punishment violate the right to dignity, the right to freedom and security of the 
person, as well as the right to bodily and psychological integrity, in the most heinous 
manner. The act of one person inflicting severe physical or mental pain on another in 
order to achieve any objective can only be described as a gross human rights 
violation. Such violations are of a particular concern when the perpetrator is acting 
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on behalf of a government which, in principle, has a duty to protect the rights of its 
citizens and other people within its jurisdiction. 
 
As the highest law, the Constitution governs the right to freedom from torture in 
section 12(1) (e) of the Constitution. In terms of section 1 of the Constitution, dignity 
is a founding value underlying our constitutional democracy. As O’Regan held in S v 
Makwanyane 
The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be 
overemphasised. Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth 
of human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and 
concern
204
. 
 
 
In S v Makwanyane205the principal argument was that the imposition of the death 
penalty for murder was a "cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment". It was further 
argued that the death sentence is an affront to human dignity, is inconsistent with the 
unqualified right to life entrenched in the Constitution, cannot be corrected in case of 
error or enforced in a manner that is not arbitrary, and that it negates the essential 
content of the right to life and the other rights that flow from it. The death penalty was 
accordingly declared unconstitutional.  
 
In Mohamed and Another v President of Republic of South Africa and Others 206, 
Mohamed was alleged to have been involved in the bombing of the United States 
embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He faced charges in the United States of 
murder, murder with conspiracy as well as a charge of an attack on a United States 
facility.207 Mohamed was a Tanzanian national, who had fled to South Africa on a 
visitor’s visa with a false passport under a false name. He applied for asylum in 
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South Africa under an assumed name.208 He was afforded temporary residential 
status, which was to be reviewed periodically pending the decision on his application 
for asylum.209 He was brought before court, where inconsistent statements by 
officials of the Department of Home Affairs resulted in a conflict of evidence on the 
question of whether Mohamed was entitled to the protection against self-
incrimination, the right to remain silent and the right to legal representation.210 
Mohamed was handed over to the FBI and interrogated, after which he confessed to 
the embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam.211 Mohamed left South Africa for the United 
States in the custody of the FBI212. 
 
The Constitutional Court held that the surrender of Mohamed violated both the Aliens 
Control Act213 and the Constitution.214 The former statute permits deportation only to 
a country of which the person is a national. The constitution had been violated in that 
the South African immigration authorities had failed to obtain a prior undertaking 
from the US government that, if convicted, the death penalty would not be imposed 
on Mohamed.215 This failure infringed his rights to dignity, to life and not to be 
punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner. The court made it clear that a 
person ought not to be deported or extradited to another state where there was a 
real risk that his basic human rights would be violated in that state.216 
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Extradition has not escaped the impact of human rights law. Extradition agreements 
can exclude extradition where the crime in respect of which extradition is sought is 
punishable by death in the state requesting extradition, but not the requested state, 
unless the requesting state provides a satisfactory assurance that the death penalty 
will not be imposed, or if imposed, will not be executed217. In Mohamed v President 
of the RSA the Constitutional Court held that it was unconstitutional to extradite any 
person including undocumented foreigners to a country where he or she may face 
the death penalty. The Convention against Torture218, as mentioned above, prohibit 
extradition where there are substantial grounds for believing that the extradited 
person will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the requesting state. The decision is a clear indication of the high 
premium placed by the Constitutional Court on the protection of the fundamental 
rights219 contained in the Bill of Rights. 
 
The use of evidence obtained through torture is indirectly governed by section 35(5) 
of the Constitution which provides that: 
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if 
the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice.  
In cases where the right to freedom from torture has been violated, that evidence 
must be excluded because its admission will always render the trial unfair and be 
detrimental to the administration of justice. 
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The case of S v Mthembu220, dealt with torture of a state witness. The appellant’s 
argument was that a false implication had existed as police used torture in obtaining 
the evidence. The legal question the court had to determine was whether the 
evidence relating to the discovery of the objects was obtained within the scope of 
section 35(5) of the Constitution, and if it should be excluded. The issue in  this case 
was the admissibility of statements obtained under torture to secure a conviction of a 
suspect.  
 
The Court acknowledged that this was the first time since the advent of the 
constitutional order in which torture involved a third party thereof no precedence. In 
this regard the Court used the plain reading of section 35(5) and held that it required 
that the exclusion of evidence improperly obtained from any person not only from an 
accused. The Court further looked at section 12 of the Constitution. The Court held 
that there was no doubt that the police had indeed violated all these rights in the 
manner that they treated Ramseroop221. The Court further looked at international law 
as South Africa is a party to a number of treaties. It looked at the definition of torture 
under article 1 of the Convention against Torture (CAT), which requires that, the act 
to be performed for the purpose of obtaining ‘information or a confession’. This is the 
mischief at which the CAT is aimed held the Court.222 The Court also looked at 
article 15 of CAT with regards to the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of 
torture: 
Each State shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a 
result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person 
accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made. 
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The Court held that it cannot be clearer that the absolute prohibition of the use of 
torture demands that ‘any evidence’ which is obtained as a result of torture must be 
excluded ‘in any proceedings’.223 
 
In conclusion the Court held that to admit Ramseroop’s testimony regarding the Hilux 
and metal box would require the court to turn a blind eye to the manner in which the 
police obtained the information from him. This then would compromise the integrity 
of the judicial process and dishonour the administration of justice.224 In the long term, 
the admission of torture induced evidence can only have a corrosive effect on the 
criminal justice system. The public interest, demands its exclusion, irrespective of 
whether such evidence has an impact on the fairness of the trial. For all these 
reasons Ramseroop’s evidence relating to the Hilux and metal box were held to 
inadmissible. 
 
On the 29th July 2013 the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 225 
come into operation and officially criminalized torture in South Africa. The Act is 
further supposed to provide for some of the obligations created by the Convention in 
which it falls short to. The Act defined torture as: 
“Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person-(a)For such purpose as to-(i) obtain information or a confession from him or her 
or any other person;(ii) punish him or her for an act he or she or any other person has 
committed, is suspected of having committed or is planning to commit; or(iii) intimidate or 
coarse him or her or any other person to do, or to refrain from doing, anything, or (b) for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity, but does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent 
in or incidental to lawful sanctions” 
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The Act provides that “no person shall be expelled, returned of extradited to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture”.226 The Act further does not consider “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment” as envisaged in article 16 of the Convention. The 
Convention does not only recognise torture but also CIDT as a form of torture.   
There is an obligation on States Parties to prevent both torture and CIDT. 
Experience has also demonstrated that the conditions that give rise to CIDT 
frequently facilitate torture and therefore the measures required to prevent torture 
must be applied to prevent CIDT.227 
 
 In as much as the Act might have these shortcomings, South Africa has finally 
criminalized torture after having ratified the Convention more than 14 years ago 
(1998). This is indeed a step forward in protecting and developing the freedom from 
torture.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
As pointed out above, no records of cases on extradition and torture do exist but 
rather of extradition and death penalty and the right to life. Our courts have refused 
to in cases where the requesting state fails to provide an assurance that the death 
penalty will not be imposed or if imposed, will not be executed. The first case to deal 
with the matter of death penalty’s consistency with the Constitution was S v 
Makwanyane and Another228. The Court held that the imposition of  thedeath penalty 
for murder was a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and declared it 
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unconstitutional. Later the court was challenged with a legal question of whether a 
person in South Africa could be extradited where the possibility of death penalty 
existed in the requesting state229. With such a precedent a reasonable presumption 
can be drawn that if our courts refuse extradition based on death penalty surely 
extradition based on the violation of the freedom from torture can be included as 
unconstitutional. Even though there might be no case law to justify this but the 
Convention against Torture230 further prohibits extradition where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the extradited person will be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
state. This is also prohibited by section 8 of the Prevention and Combating of Torture 
Act. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE LAW ON EXTRADITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM TORTURE 
 
4.1  Extradition and human rights in South Africa under constitutional order 
In ancient times there were no legal rules that were followed in terms of extradition 
but it was rather merely considered as a highly political act which was left to the 
unfettered discretion of the sovereign231. Sovereigns could choose to grant asylums 
or oblige each other by surrendering those persons who were most likely to affect 
the political order within the requesting state232. Hence extradition primarily involved 
political refugees rather than common criminals. Until the middle of the 18 th century, 
extradition primarily involved political refugees rather than common criminals233. 
 
Prior to constitutionalism, the Extradition Act governed all procedural challenges to 
extradition234. Section 11 (b) (ii) provides for certain limitations in respect of 
extradition, it states that: 
The Minister may(b) Order that a person shall not be surrendered-(ii) Where such person is 
serving, or is about to serve a sentence of a termof imprisonment, until such sentence has 
been completed; 
 
These limits apply to request for extradition not made in good faith or where the 
extradition is not in the best interests of justice235. The Minister may also refuse an 
extradition request where the requested extradition would be unjust or unreasonable 
or where the punishment that may be imposed is too severe236. These limitations 
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may be referred to as humanitarian grounds237. They apply when the prosecution of 
the offender whose extradition has been requested outweighs any advantage of 
such prosecution238.  
 
In the S v Williams239 case, the appellant was convicted on charges of possession of 
mandrax drugs in Botswana which was in contravention of the Botswana Habit 
Forming Drugs Act. Whilst on bail he fled to South Africa, he was later arrested and 
detained in South Africa. The court hearing the extradition proceedings held that the 
appellant was liable to be returned to Botswana and an order was granted for his 
surrender. The appellant appealed against the order arguing that the sentence was 
unduly severe and the discrepancy between possession and aggravated possession 
was grossly unjust and unreasonable240. 
 
The legal question facing the court was whether or not to extradite in terms of the 
penalty imposed by the Botswana law being too severe. It was argued on behalf of 
the appellant that there was a discrepancy in regards to the sentencing between 
South Africa and the sentence that would be imposed in Botswana and that the 
interests of justice would be better served if appellant were not surrendered to the 
Botswana officials241. The mandatory sentence in terms of the Botswana Habit 
Forming Drugs Act included (a) imprisonment for 10 to 15 years; (b) a fine of P15 
000 or in default, additional imprisonment of between 3 to 5 years; (c) corporal 
punishment. 
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 The Court looked at the provisions of section 12(2) of the Extradition Act, which, as 
mentioned earlier, gave mandate to Magistrates to determine whether, in all the 
circumstances of the case, the penalty to be imposed would be unjust, unreasonable 
or too severe. The court held that that: 
The purpose of extradition would be frustrated if each time an application for extradition came 
before the courts they were to engage in a comparative analysis to determine the exact 
nature of the punishment which might be imposed with reference to the penalties for 
comparative offenses in South Africa
242
.  
 
From a human rights’ perspective, it is significant to note that in this case the court 
found that it would not extradite an offender to a state that probabilities are it would 
impose a sentence that is wholly inappropriate or unconscionable. Even though one 
of the legal issues raised by the appellant was the issue of corporal punishment, the 
court still granted extradition. The court focused too much on the discrepancy of the 
sentencing and ignored or did not pay much of its attention to the fact that the 
appellant could be subjected to corporal punishment violating his right to human 
dignity. One should recall that this case was decided in 1988 before corporal 
punishment as a form of punishment in public institutions was outlawed in South 
Africa. However, in the light of the fact that the South African Constitution prohibits 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment243 and the Constitution Court 
held that corporal punishment amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
and is an affront to human dignity244, the precedent set in this case is of little value 
today. Following this precedent would be a loophole in the light of the fact that the 
case was decided when the country was still under apartheid system which did not 
protect and uphold human rights. It is also to be borne in mind that extradition cases 
during the apartheid era were mostly practiced between states under the principle of 
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reciprocity with no formal procedure followed thus there are not many recorded case 
law on extradition during this period. 
 
4.2 Extradition during constitutionalism  
In 1993 the Interim Constitution was promulgated and had a profound effect on the 
promotion and protection of human rights245. The Final Constitution of 1996 upheld 
this protection. The Constitution places a duty on the state to protect the 
fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights246. 
 
4.2.1 The right to life and extradition 
Closely related to the issue of torture in the context of extradition is the issue of the 
right to life. It is therefore necessary that I deal with the issue of the right to life and 
extradition. This is because in the case of S v Makwanyane247, the issue of torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment featured highly when the 
Constitutional Court had to decide whether the death penalty was unconstitutional. 
Extradition has not escaped the impact of human rights law. Extradition agreements 
can exclude extradition where the crime in respect of which extradition is sought is 
punishable by death in the state requesting extradition, but not the requested state, 
unless the requesting state provides a satisfactory assurance that the death 
penalty248 will not be imposed, or if imposed, will not be executed249. In Mohamed v 
President of the RSA and Others250the Constitutional Court held that it was 
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unconstitutional to extradite any person, including undocumented foreigners, to a 
country where he or she may face the death penalty251.  
 
In Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa252, the applicants 
in this case were South African citizens who were held in Zimbabwe on various 
charges. The applicants were accused of being mercenaries and plotting a coup 
against the President of Equatorial Guinea. The applicants were fearful of extradition 
from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea where they contended that they would not 
receive a fair trial and, if convicted they stood the risk of being sentenced to death. 
The applicants applied for an order compelling the South African government to 
make certain representations on their behalf to the governments of Zimbabwe and 
Equatorial Guinea, and to take steps to ensure that their right to dignity, freedom and 
security and their right to fair conditions of detention and trial were at all times 
respected and protected in Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea. 
 
The Judges in the case of Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa concurred that a South African who faces the death penalty abroad has a right 
to request the government for protection against it253. The policy of the South African 
government with regard to a request for extradition to South Africa of a South African 
citizen where the citizen has been charged with a capital offence in a foreign state is 
that representations will be made on behalf of the citizen if and when capital 
punishment is imposed254.  
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A more recent judgment by the Constitutional Court is the Minister of Home Affairs v 
Tsebe and others,255the Constitutional Court handed down a judgment in two similar 
cases dealing with the issue of whether the South African Government is entitled to 
deport or extradite a person, charged with a capital offence in a country seeking his 
extradition, after having sought and been refused a written assurance from the 
extraditing state that the death penalty will not be imposed, or, if imposed, will not be 
executed. 
 
 They applied to the South Gauteng High Court (High Court) for an order preventing 
the Government from extraditing or deporting them to Botswana to stand trial for the 
charges of murder of their respective romantic partners, unless Botswana provided 
South Africa with a written assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed or 
if imposed must not be executed256. The Government had, in fact, sought and been 
refused that undertaking257. The High Court nevertheless granted the order, relying 
on an earlier judgment of the High Court in, Mohamed v President of the Republic of 
South Africa (Mohamed), which, as discussed earlier, held that a person may not be 
surrendered to a country where he or she faces the death penalty without first 
seeking an assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed. 
 
The Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Justice both appealed directly to the 
Constitutional Court against the decision of the High Court. The Minister of Home 
Affairs argued that the High Court incorrectly treated the Mohamed case as laying 
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down an absolute principle that operated regardless of the facts of the case and as a 
result, it was unsure how to exercise her obligations under the Immigration Act258. 
 
 The Constitutional Court dismissed both appeals259. The court found that because 
none of the parties argue that Mohamed was wrongly decided, and because there 
were no good reasons to distinguish this case, the principle in that case had to be 
applied. In this judgment the Court went further than Mohamed to require not only 
that the South African Government seek assurance, but also obtain that assurance, 
failing which extradition could not be granted260. By adopting the Constitution, they 
reasoned, South Africa affirmed its commitment to upholding the human rights of 
every person in everything that it did, and could not deport or extradite any person, 
where doing so would expose him or her to the real risk of the imposition and 
execution of the death penalty261. This was further justified by the extradition treaty 
between Botswana and South Africa and the SADC Protocol on Extradition (SADC 
Extradition Protocol)262. Acting Judge Ray Zondo noted that: 
We as a nation have chosen to walk the path of the advancement of human rights … no 
matter who the person is and no matter what the crime is that he is alleged to have 
committed, we shall not in any way be party to his killings as a punishment and we will not 
hand such person over to another country [and] … expose him to the real risk of the 
imposition and the death penalty upon him
263
. 
 
In his judgment, Zondo, noting that South Africa had passed legislation allowing for 
people to be tried in South Africa for specific crimes committed outside its borders, 
like Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act and the Implementation of 
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the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act for crimes against humanity 
wrote: 
There is no reason why similar legislation cannot or should not be put in place to ensure that 
persons … can be tried by the South African courts when countries in which they allegedly 
committed the crimes are not prepared to give the requisite assurance that suspects will not 
face the death penalty when tried
264
. 
He concluded thereof that South Africa will not extradite foreign nationals suspected 
of crimes that may lead to them facing the death penalty in those countries that seek 
to try them265.  
 
The Tsebe judgment reinforced an earlier precedent setting judgment handed down 
by the Constitutional Court that related to Mohamed who was wanted by the United 
States in connection with the bombing of its embassy in Tanzania in 1998. The 
Constitutional Court ruled previously that even if there was an extradition agreement 
between South Africa and the US, he could not be handed over without an 
assurance that he would not face the death penalty. 
The Court again emphasised that the imposition of the death penalty is 
unconstitutional, in line with the judgment of Mohamed266. 
 
4.2.2 The right to a fair trial and extradition 
It is importantthat the extradited person will have a fair trial. The Extradition Act 
provides that a person will not be extradited if the person will be subjected to 
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prejudice at his or her trial in the requesting state by reason of his or her gender, 
race, religion nationality or political opinion267. 
 
 Most states, including South Africa, are party to international human rights treaties 
such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights268 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which guarantees the right to a fair trial. Some 
extradition agreements provide for the application of human rights norms, but even 
those extradition agreements that do not provide for such application may refuse 
extradition on the grounds of human rights. The two principle human rights norms in 
many extradition treaties provide for the non-imposition of the death penalty and 
non-discrimination269. It is important that the extradited person will have a fair trial. 
As seen in chapter 2 the extradition to South Africa of Shrien Dewani was 
temporarily suspended on grounds of his mental health. The Court held that it would 
be unjust and oppressive for him to be sent to South Africa until he recovered. But 
this the court held it was plainly in the interest of justice that he was extradited as 
soon as he was deemed fit enough to stand trial. The court, however, rejected his 
appeal on human rights grounds as it noted that the prison conditions in South Africa 
were not a basis not to extradite. The Court focused more on his mental health and 
held that his right to fair would not be violated if he was extradited when he was not 
fit to stand trial. The application by the South African government for Dewani's 
extradition was successful. 
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The South African domestic extradition law provides that a person will not be 
extradited if the extradited person will be prejudiced at his or her trial in the 
requesting state by reason of his or her gender, race, religion nationality or political 
opinion270. It is therefore important that the extradited person will have a fair trial. 
 
4.2.3 The protection of the right to freedom from torture and extradition 
According to the Mohamed case, the court made it clear that a person ought not be 
deported or extradited to another state where there was a real risk that his basic 
human rights would be violated in that state. Because South Africa is a party to the 
Convention against Torture271 which, under article 3, prohibits, amongst other things, 
extradition where there are substantial grounds for believing that the extradited 
person will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the requesting state, it has a duty to respect its international law 
obligation. The rationale is that the 1984 U.N. Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment prohibits the extradition as 
well as the deportation of a person to a state "where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” and allows no 
derogation. In order to determine whether or not there are substantial grounds to 
believe that a person will be subjected to torture, South Africa has to refer to article 3 
(2) of the Convention against Torture. 
 
The same obligation in terms of article 3 of the Convention against Torture is also 
imposed by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Resolution on 
Guidelines and Measure for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, 
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa272, the Robben Island 
Guidelines, which provides that ‘states should ensure no one is expelled or 
extradited to a country where he or she is at risk of being subjected to torture’.273 The 
Committee against Torture, the enforcement body of the Convention against Torture, 
has called upon different countries such as Rwanda not to extradite persons to 
countries where there are substantial grounds to believe that they could be subjected 
to torture274.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has also handed down different judgements 
prohibiting states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Principles from extraditing persons to countries where there is a risk 
that they could be tortured.275 Although I am not aware of any case in which South 
African courts have declined to order the extradition of a person to a country where 
he or she could be subjected to torture, the above jurisprudence from South African 
courts and from international human rights bodies compel me to conclude that in the 
light of South Africa’s national and international human rights obligations, it has a 
duty not to extradite a person to a country where there are substantial grounds to 
believe that he or she would be subjected to torture. 
 
 
                                                          
272
 Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa, 32nd Session, 17 - 23 October 2002: 
Banjul, The Gambia. 
273
Paragraph 15. For a detailed discussion of the Robben Island Guidelines, see Long D & Murray R 
‘Ten years of the Robben Island Guidelines and Prevention of torture in Africa: For what purpose?’ 
(2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 311-347. 
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 In Chahal v. United Kingdom ,' in which the European Court of Human Rights held that since there 
was a real risk of Chahal being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights if he were returned to India, the U.K. order for his deportation to India 
would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
Because of the isolation South Africa found itself in, there were no real extradition 
treaties and South Africa relied only on the Extradition Act276. During the 18th century 
countries would exchange offenders through reciprocal mechanism, and because 
the alleged offenders were mostly of political rather than common offenders there 
was no law protecting the offenders’ rights. Courts did not pay much attention to the 
rights violated by the practise of extradition instead more focus was placed on the 
sentencing and punishment277. This mentality changed when the Constitution came 
into force. The Constitutional Court held that the death penalty278 and corporal 
punishment279were unconstitutional as they violated, inter alia, the right to human 
dignity if not to be subjected to CIDT. Since the establishment of the new 
constitutional order in 1994 courts have shown a great willingness to be guided by 
international human rights law. 
 
 In most cases in the past acts of torture occurred in the custody of police 
authority280. This was also promoted by the government as it was part of the security 
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S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC); 
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S v Madikane& Others 1990 (1) SACR 377 (N).Decided at 386B-C that the application of electric 
shocks amounted to grievous bodily harm. Policemen were found guilty of murder and assault with 
intent to commit grievous bodily harm after two suspects had electric shocks administered to them. 
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 S v A en ‘n Ander 1991 (2) SACR 257 (N). The complainant alleged that two police officers ordered 
him to masturbate. He was also required to lick a few drops of urine from the floor and had electric 
shocks administered to his genitals. The police officers were found guilty of indecent assault and 
sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment. The court commented at 270G that the application of electric 
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S v Moolman 1993 (2) SACR 519 (EC). A policeman was found guilty of assault with intent to commit 
grievous bodily harm after the complainant was assaulted over a number of days by being hit with a 
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system during the apartheid era. It was only after the Constitution did South Africa 
protect persons that are deprived of their liberty from the practises of torture. 
However, there is evidence and allegations that torture is still practiced by law 
enforcement officers such as police281 and Department of Correctional Services 
official.282 Because of the fact that the most vulnerable victims of torture are those 
that are deprived of their liberty, section 35(3) of the Constitution protects the 
individual’s rights to a fair trial283. There might be no direct cases dealing with torture 
and extradition in South Africa but a presumption can be drawn with regards to 
human rights, that our courts are under an international and national duty to protect 
individual’s human rights. That entails refusal to extradite persons that are in danger 
of torture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
belt and kicked, his head covered whilst electric shocks were administered to him until he became 
unconscious. The accused was sentenced to three years imprisonment, of which one was 
suspended. 
S v Maritz 1996 (1) SACR 405 (A). A policeman forced a murder suspect to run in front of a vehicle 
while tied to it by rope. A wheel of the vehicle caught the rope and pulled him under the vehicle, 
causing his death. The policeman was found guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced to four years 
imprisonment, of which two years were suspended. 
281
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Research Paper No. 4, pg 36 
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Chapter 5  
CONCLUSION 
Extradition proceedings have evolved over a period of time, characterised by a shift 
in emphasis on the various types of crimes to which this process is applicable. 
Historically, the practice of extradition was dependent upon the good relations 
between the sovereigns of the requested state and the requesting state. Presently 
extradition has taken on a more formal nature with prescribed procedures necessary 
to affect it. In South Africa the development of extradition law has followed the path 
of the various periods in the country’s history. The most notable period was being 
that of the Apartheid era, where many states refused to interact with South Africa 
due to political reasons. Such period also saw the implementation of the Extradition 
Act which has governed extradition since its enactment in 1962. The position in 
South Africa changed in 1993 with the introduction of a constitutional dispensation 
resulting in an end to South Africa’s political isolation and its re-admittance into the 
Commonwealth. As a result the past decade has seen South Africa bring a party to 
two treaties and conventions for extradition. 
 
Currently most states conclude bilateral treaties and or multilateral conventions in 
regard to extradition. These treaties and conventions contain specific provisions in 
regard to extradition and clearly set out the standard for executing an extradition 
request. In most cases the ground for refusal according to the treaty or convention 
will be when the offender will not receive a fair trial in the requesting state or where, 
if convicted the offender faces the death penalty.  
The South African Constitution clearly states that it is a vital objective to ensure that 
all fundamental rights are upheld and protected. With regard to fair trial procedures, 
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a recent development has been the constitutional challenges to various provisions in 
the Extradition Act. It has been contended that s10 of the Extradition Act as well as 
the ad hoc consent284 to extradition of the President as a method to effect extradition 
is unconstitutional. It is also evident from recent decisions in the Constitutional Court 
that the abuse of an individual’s right to life is an important factor to be considered 
where the decision of whether or not to extradite is considered in South Africa. It is 
clear that the Constitutional Court is guided by precedents set by courts from other 
jurisdictions and by international law relating to extradition when determining which 
rights will outweigh the need for international co-operation in the suppression of 
crime.  
 
Extraditions are challenged on the ground that it would infringe the offender’s right to 
fair trial procedures, the right to life, bodily integrity and dignity. As a result the 
requested state is forced to balance the protection of the human rights of the 
individual whose extradition has been requested with the necessity of ensuring that 
criminal laws of sovereign states are enforced. It is the safe to conclude that based 
on the precedent laid down by our Courts that if an individual’ s right to freedom from 
torture is at jeopardy then the state has a duty to protect that individual by refusing 
extradition. Put differently, even though there might not be case law on extradition 
based on torture in South Africa, the Convention against Torture prohibits extradition 
where there are grounds for believing that the extradited person will be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting 
state. This is also provided for by section 8 of the Prevention and Combating of 
Torture Act. This therefore means that South Africa is obliged not only by 
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international law but by its domestic law. There is a duty for South Africa to protect 
and respect these provisions by upholding them and making sure that no individual 
is subjected to torture.  
In the Soering case the European Court of Human Rights did emphasise that there 
are specific circumstances concerning the death penalty in the requesting state that 
may constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. With regard to 
the death row phenomenon, the court stated the following: 
“However in the courts view, having regard to the very long period of time spent on death row 
in such extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting execution 
of the death penalty, and to the personal circumstances of the applicant, especially his age 
and mental state at the time of the offence, the applicant’s extradition to the United States 
would expose him to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3. A 
further consideration of relevance is that in the particular instance the legitimate purpose of 
extradition could be achieved by another means that would not involve suffering of such 
exceptional intensity or duration… Accordingly, the Secretary of State’s decision to extradite 
the applicant to the United States would, if implemented, give rise to a breach of Article 3”.
285
 
The Court upheld Soering’s claim that his extradition to face the death penalty 
constituted inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by Art 3. The Court also 
stated that the state from which extradition is requested must take into account any 
potential violation of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights by authorities in the requesting state, regardless of whether or not the latter is 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights. The decision taken in the 
Soering case is an example of the impact that human rights have had on extradition 
proceedings. In the past the state from which extradition was requested did not 
investigate the criminal justice system of that state requesting the extradition due to 
the doctrine of state sovereignty and principles based on the comity of nations286. 
This then shows the considerations taken by states before extraditing a fugitive to 
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the requesting state. It is visible that human rights must be protected at all costs, that 
any legal tension between human rights fugitive and the right of states to extradite 
must be scrutinized, and if there exist any possibility of infringement of the fugitives’ 
human rights, a guarantee must be made by the requesting state that the fugitive will 
not be subjected to any inhuman conduct. 
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